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THE COGNITIVELY ILLIBERAL STATE 
Dan M. Kahan* 
Ought implies can. This Article investigates whether the central moral direc-
tives of liberalism are ones citizens can—as a matter of human cognition—be ex-
pected to honor. Liberalism obliges the state to disclaim a moral orthodoxy and 
instead premise legal obligation on secular grounds accessible to persons of di-
verse cultural persuasions. Studies of the phenomenon of cultural cognition, 
however, suggest that individuals naturally impute socially harmful consequences 
to behavior that defies their moral norms. As a result, they are impelled to re-
press morally deviant behavior even when they honestly perceive themselves to 
be motivated only by the secular good of harm prevention. This Article identifies 
how this dynamic transforms seemingly instrumental debates over environmental 
regulation, public health, economic policy, and crime control into polarizing 
forms of illiberal status competition. It also proposes a counterintuitive remedy: 
rather than attempt to cleanse the law of culturally partisan meanings—the dis-
course strategy associated with the liberal norm of public reason—lawmakers 
should endeavor to infuse it with a surfeit of meanings capable of simultaneously 
affirming a wide range of competing worldviews.  
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Liberal ideals figure prominently in American law and political culture. 
The ban on state endorsement of partisan visions of the good animates domi-
nant understandings of the individual rights provisions of the Constitution.1 
The duty of lawmakers, judges, and citizens to justify their positions on 
grounds susceptible of affirmation by persons of diverse moral persuasions—
paradigmatically, the prevention of harm—is deeply woven into prevailing 
norms of legal and political discourse.2 No thoughtful observer would assert 
that the United States is today a perfectly liberal state, but none could realisti-
cally deny the persistent (if uneven and contested) influence the aspiration to 
become one has had on the development of American institutions.3 
My goal in this Article is to identify a distinctive ground for questioning 
the viability of the liberal project. Unlike many well-known critiques of liberal-
ism, the concern I will raise does not question either the normative appeal or 
the conceptual coherence of the liberal commitment to neutrality.4 I will sug-
 
1. Cf., e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-72 (2003) (holding that it deprives 
individuals of “liberty” under the Due Process Clause for the “majority [to] use the power of 
the State to enforce . . . on the whole society” standards of private conduct that originate in 
“religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the tradi-
tional family”); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“[N]o official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion . . . .”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
767, 818-22 (2001). 
2. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1980) 
(defending norm of “constrain[ed] . . . power talk” that prohibits any “power holder” from 
offering a justification for law that proclaims “his conception of the good is better than that 
asserted by any of his fellow citizens”); STEVEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON 
THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 234 (1995) (defending democratic “gag rules” that 
constrain appeal to divisive issues of value in order to enable “citizens who differ greatly in 
outlook on life [to] work together to solve common problems.”); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 175, 217-18 (1993) (articulating norm of “public reason” that prohibits political 
actors in most contexts from invoking “comprehensive doctrines” that “include[] concep-
tions of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character” and 
instead “explain . . . how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be sup-
ported by” considerations consistent with “a diversity of reasonable religious and philoso-
phical doctrines”). 
3. For attempts to integrate this understanding of liberalism with the development of 
American law and constitutional law in particular, see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION 
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985). 
4. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT IN THE AGE 
OF TERRORISM (2002); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN 
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS 
OF JUSTICE (1982).  
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gest instead an important practical barrier to the attainment of this ideal. My 
objection to liberalism is neither metaphysical nor political5 but cognitive: we 
lack the psychological capacity, I’ll suggest, to make, interpret, and administer 
law without indulging sensibilities pervaded by our attachments to highly con-
tested visions of the good. 
The foundation of my argument is the phenomenon of “cultural cogni-
tion.”6 Cultural cognition refers to a collection of psychological mechanisms 
that moor our perceptions of societal danger to our cultural values. In apprais-
ing societal risks, for example, we rely critically on value-pervaded emotions 
such as fear and disgust. To minimize dissonance, we more readily notice and 
recall instances of calamity that appear to be occasioned by behavior we abhor 
than by behavior we revere. Where members of society disagree about the 
harmfulness of a particular form of conduct, we instinctively trust those who 
share our values—and whose judgments are likely to be biased in a particular 
direction by emotion, dissonance avoidance, and related mechanisms. 
These dynamics confront the liberal aspiration with a special dilemma. As 
a result of cultural cognition, we naturally view behavior that denigrates our 
moral norms as endangering public health, undermining civil order, and imped-
ing the accumulation of societal wealth. Under these circumstances, the prom-
ise not to interfere with the liberty of individuals except to prevent harm to oth-
ers is likely to be rendered meaningless: whenever individuals deviate from 
dominant understandings of virtue, they will be perceived as sources of harm. 
Even lawmakers who honestly focus their attention only on promoting secular 
goods—ones of value to all citizens, irrespective of their worldviews—will be 
impelled to create a system of repressive regulation that expresses and rein-
forces a partisan moral orthodoxy. 
This condition of cognitive illiberalism, I’m convinced, is endemic in our 
law today. Indeed, we can all readily perceive instances of coercive regulation 
that rest on empirical claims about harm accepted only because they are conge-
nial to the partisan worldviews of those who favor such regulation. The prob-
lem is that we have highly polarized understandings of what those regulations 
are—criminalization of marijuana, the banning of (or refusal to ban) possession 
of handguns, exclusion of gays from the military, the moratorium on construc-
tion of nuclear power plants—precisely because we subscribe to competing cul-
tural worldviews. The selective apprehension of cognitive illiberalism is part 
and parcel of the phenomenon itself. 
Is there a solution? Although there is (I’m convinced) no effective “debias-
 
5. Cf. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 223 (1985).  
6. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of 
Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083-88 
(2006) (book review). For materials, including published and unpublished papers, relating to 
the study of cultural cognition, see The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition. 
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ing” technique for cognitive illiberalism, I will suggest a strategy to make citi-
zens of diverse outlooks at least conscious of its impact and committed to con-
structing a regime of mutually agreeable regulation despite it. 
Ironically, this strategy involves dispensing with a feature of our legal and 
political culture thought to be essential to liberalism: the norm of “public rea-
son,” which enjoins legislators, judges, and citizens to justify law in secular 
terms acceptable to persons of diverse cultural and moral persuasions. The in-
tractability of cognitive illiberalism reveals the practice of public reason to be a 
conceit—a form of false consciousness that compounds the impulse to enforce 
a moral orthodoxy by enabling its agents to deny (to themselves even more than 
to others) that this is exactly what they are doing. I advocate in its place an id-
iom of expressive overdetermination, which, far from cleansing legal and po-
litical discourse of cultural values, self-consciously multiplies the cultural 
meanings that laws are susceptible of bearing. In a regime of expressively 
overdetermined law, there will be fewer occasions for disagreement as citizens 
of diverse cultural outlooks seek to identify policies that promote their collec-
tive interests, and more opportunities for all to find affirmation of their world-
views notwithstanding the conflicts that persist. 
I’ll develop this argument in three Parts. In Part I, I will examine the phe-
nomenon of cultural cognition and the role it plays in our perception of societal 
harms. In Part II, I will examine the problem of cognitive illiberalism—the in-
evitable tendency, as a result of the cultural cognition of harm, for the law to 
embrace a partisan moral orthodoxy as citizens seek to identify the most effica-
cious means of achieving putatively secular ends. Finally, in Part III, I will dis-
cuss how the impact of cognitive illiberalism can be muted if not eradicated 
through a discourse norm of expressive overdetermination. 
I. THE CULTURAL COGNITION OF HARM 
The equation of vice with danger is a familiar characteristic of premodern 
cosmologies. Emperor Justinian banned sodomy in the sixth century to protect 
his subjects from pestilence, famine, and earthquake.7 The ancient Jews ob-
served the commandments of Yahweh lest he “strike [them] with consumption, 
and with fever and with inflammation and with fiery heat and with the sword 
and with blight and with mildew.”8 The Cheyenne believed the scent of a tribe 
member who had murdered a fellow tribe member would drive away the buf-
falo and thus spoil the hunt.9 In the primitive world, “the laws of nature are 
dragged in to sanction the moral code: this kind of disease is caused by adul-
tery, that by incest; this meteorological disaster is the effect of political disloy-
 
7. See LOUIS CROMPTON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND CIVILIZATION 537 (2003).  
8. Deuteronomy 28:22 (New American Standard Bible). 
9. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION 
AND TABOO 88 (1966).  
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alty, that the effect of impiety.”10 In this way, “[t]he whole universe is har-
nessed to men’s attempts to force one another into good citizenship.”11 
We moderns are no less disposed to believe that moral transgressions 
threaten societal harm.12 This perception is not, as is conventionally supposed, 
a product of superstition or unreasoning faith in authority. Rather it is the pre-
dictable consequence of the limited state of any individual’s experience with 
natural and social causation, and the role that cultural commitments inevitably 
play in helping to compensate for this incompleteness in knowledge. What truly 
distinguishes ours from the premodern condition in this sense is not the advent 
of modern science; it is the multiplication of cultural worldviews, competition 
among which has generated historically unprecedented conflict over how to 
protect society from harm at the very same time that science has progressively 
enlarged our understandings of how our world works. 
Start with a puzzle: how do ordinary people figure out what sorts of activi-
ties are harmful, either for them individually or for their communities collec-
tively? Personal experience—did I (or my children) contract leukemia from liv-
ing in the vicinity of a toxic waste dump? did I get shot by a violent criminal 
because my state failed to adopt a “right to carry” law? will my planet suffer 
catastrophic environmental consequences if global warming isn’t reversed in 
the next decade?—provides necessarily inconclusive (not to mention untimely) 
guidance. Scientists have amassed a wealth of empirical data on many putative 
dangers. But very few people have the time or inclination to sort through such 
studies, or the capacity to understand the technical information they contain and 
to evaluate the relative quality of them when they reach conflicting results. 
We nevertheless manage to form beliefs about harm—usually supremely 
confident ones—through heuristics.13 Some of these belief-formation strategies 
are relatively straightforward and deliberate: confronted with competing claims 
about the hazards of a particular technology or medical procedure, or the effi-
cacy of a disputed policy, we sample the views of those whom we have associ-
ated with, or defer to the opinions of experts whose judgment we trust.14 Others 
 
10. Id. at 3. 
11. Id. 
12. Bernard Harcourt has suggested that “conservatives” have only recently adopted 
harm prevention as a rationale for restricting conduct traditionally subject to prohibition on 
moral grounds. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 109, 113-16 (1999). As Douglas’s writings help to show, his thesis is incor-
rect in two respects. First, the equation of deviance with harm has always pervaded justifica-
tions for prohibiting behavior that defies prevailing norms. And second, the association of 
deviance with harm is by no means distinctive of conservatism. See MARY DOUGLAS & 
AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 8 (1982) [hereinafter DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, RISK] (arguing 
that every mode of social organization selects its own schedule of risks as a means of ex-
pressing and reinforcing values). 
13. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC & AMOS TVERSKY, JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982). 
14. For classic studies, see S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification 
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are more complex and less observable. We instinctively impute danger, for ex-
ample, to activities that evoke negative emotions—such as fear, dread, anger, 
and disgust.15 We form estimations of the relative magnitude of risks based on 
how readily we can recall or imagine instances of the harms with which they 
are associated.16 While hardly foolproof, such mechanisms allow us to form 
judgments about hazards that we are unable to investigate in a more systematic 
and detached fashion. 
The theory of cultural cognition posits that the heuristic processing of risk 
information interacts decisively with individuals’ defining group commit-
ments.17 Whether we regard putatively harmful activities (deviant sexual prac-
tices, gun possession, nuclear power) with fear or admiration, with disgust or 
equanimity, with dread or indifference, expresses the cultural valuations we at-
tach to those activities.18 Accordingly, to the extent that it is driven by affect, 
risk perception is necessarily conditioned by culture.19 
Culture likewise interacts with the contribution that ease of recollection, or 
“availability,” makes to estimations of risk. To avoid cognitive dissonance, we 
are much more likely to take note of and assign significance to instances of 
harm associated with behavior we despise than those associated with conduct 
we revere.20 We thus end up with culturally skewed inventories of readily re-
called and imagined misfortunes, and as a result naturally form culturally bi-
ased estimations of the danger of deviant behavior.21 
 
and Distortion of Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN 177 (Harold Guetzkow ed., 
1951); Carl I. Hovland & Walter Weiss, The Influence of Source Credibility on Communica-
tion Effectiveness, 15 PUB. OPINION Q. 635 (1951-52); and Irving Lorge, Prestige, Sugges-
tion, and Attitudes, 7 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 386 (1936). 
15. See Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The 
Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 
(2000). On the role of disgust in connoting danger, see DOUGLAS, supra note 9, at 40, and 
Valerie Curtis & Adam Biran, Dirt, Disgust, and Disease: Is Hygiene in Our Genes?, 44 
PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 17 (2001). 
16. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regu-
lation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, 
Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 165 
(John S. Carroll & John W. Payne eds., 1976).  
17. See generally Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 1084-85. 
18. See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=962520. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF 
THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001). 
19. See, e.g., Ellen M. Peters et al., An Emotion-Based Model of Risk Perception and 
Stigma Susceptibility, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1349, 1358-61 (2004) (showing that valence of af-
fective perceptions of nuclear-material risk is determined by cultural worldviews). 
20. See DOUGLAS, supra note 9, at 39-40. 
21. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cul-
tural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1314-15 (2003); Cass R. 
Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1295, 1298-1300 (2003). 
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Finally, and most importantly, culture interacts with the role that social in-
fluence has in formation of perceptions of harm. Individuals generally conform 
their beliefs to those held by their associates—both because those are the per-
sons from whom they obtain most of their information and because those are 
the ones whose respect they most desire.22 The people we are most inclined to 
associate with are those who share our cultural outlooks. The predictable result 
is highly uniform views of societal harms among persons of shared cultural 
persuasions.23 
This tendency is reinforced by the link between culture and credibility. We 
naturally impute credibility—including knowledge and shared interests—to pu-
tative experts whose cultural outlooks are congenial to our own.24 Accordingly, 
to the extent we defer to credible experts when sorting through competing 
claims about societal dangers, we are again drawn to beliefs that cohere with 
our cultural commitments. 
The link between perceptions of harm and cultural outlooks, moreover, is 
unlikely to be severed by disconfirming empirical information. Real-world 
people tend to be anti-Bayesians: rather than update their prior beliefs based on 
new information, they tend to evaluate the persuasiveness of new information 
based on its conformity to their experience.25 Known as “biased assimila-
tion,”26 this tendency also has a straightforward cultural explanation: ordinary 
 
22. See, e.g., Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group 
Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003); Diane M. 
MacKie, M. Cecilia Gastardo-Conaco & John J. Skelly, Knowledge of the Advocated Posi-
tion and the Processing of In-Group and Out-Group Persuasive Messages, 18 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 145 (1992) (discussing in-group and heuristic information process-
ing); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 
71, 88-90 (2001). 
23. See Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts, Cul-
ture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 SOC. JUST. RESEARCH 283, 289-91 (2005) [here-
inafter Braman, Modeling Facts]. 
24. See Lorge, supra note 14. 
25. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judg-
ments of Evidence Quality, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993) (dem-
onstrating this effect experimentally with a sample of trained statisticians). For an example, 
consider Nobel Prize economist Gary Becker’s explanation for his discounting of recent em-
pirical evidence that purports to refute the conclusion that the death penalty deters murder: 
Even with the limited quantitative evidence available, there are good reasons to believe that 
capital punishment deters murders. Most people, and murderers in particular, fear death, es-
pecially when it follows swiftly and with considerable certainty following the commission of 
a murder. David Hume said in discussing suicide that “no man ever threw away life, while it 
was worth living. For such is our natural horror of death . . . .” (emphasis added).  
Gary S. Becker, On the Economics of Capital Punishment, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Mar. 2006, 
at 1, available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1166&context=ev. 
26. See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Atti-
tude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979). Other mechanisms point in the same direction. 
One is “confirmation bias,” which refers to the tendency of persons to seek out and assign 
more weight to evidence that confirms a prior belief or hypothesis than to evidence discon-
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persons aren’t in a position to identify when new information is credible, and 
thus a ground for updating their prior beliefs, without recourse to the very same 
cultural heuristics that have generated their existing beliefs.27 
Biased assimilation is especially strong when the belief under challenge is 
one that is predominant within a group—such as a cultural one—that is central 
to a person’s identity. In that situation, acceptance of the new information 
threatens to drive a wedge between a person and others whose judgment she 
respects and whose good opinion she values.28 Accordingly, if the source of the 
new information is someone perceived to hold cultural commitments opposed 
to one’s own, the pressure to reject that information is all the more intense.29 
This account of how culture contributes to the perception of societal harm 
is supported by a considerable body of empirical research on risk perception. 
Much of that work grows out of the “cultural theory of risk.”30 
Studies in this family measure individuals’ cultural outlooks with scales 
patterned on a scheme devised by anthropologist Mary Douglas. Douglas clas-
sifies cultural “worldviews,” or preferences about how society should be organ-
ized, along two cross-cutting dimensions: “group” and “grid.”31 Persons who 
are “high group” favor a communitarian social order in which the needs and 
interests of individuals are subordinated to the collective, which in turn is as-
signed responsibility for securing the conditions of individual well-being. Per-
sons who are “low group,” in contrast, prefer an individualist society, in which 
 
firming it. See, e.g., Clifford R. Mynatt et al., Confirmation Bias in a Simulated Research 
Environment: An Experimental Study of Scientific Inference, 29 Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 85 (1977). Another is coherence-based reasoning, which refers to the disposition 
of persons to conform assessments of subsequently obtained evidence to inferences associ-
ated with earlier-obtained evidence in order to avoid uncertainty or ambiguity. See also Dan 
Simon, Lien B. Pham, Quang A. Le & Keith J. Holyoak, The Emergence of Coherence over 
the Course of Decision Making, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1250 (2001). 
27. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 163 (2006). 
28. See, e.g., Serena Chen, Kimberly Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated Heuris-
tic and Systematic Processing, 10 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 44, 45 (1999) (reporting that individu-
als use both heuristic and systematic reasoning in biased fashion to find confirmation of be-
liefs essential to identity, including “social identities”); Cohen, supra, note 22 (same). An 
interesting recent study found that party affiliation predicted confirmation bias in the evalua-
tion of information relating to statements made by George Bush and John Kerry. See Mi-
chael Shermer, The Political Brain, 295 SCI. AM. 36 (2006), available at 
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa006&colID=13&articleID=000CE155-1061-
1493-906183414B7F0162. Using neuro-imaging, the experiment determined that this effect 
was mediated by the activation of subjects’ emotional or affective responses to the candi-
dates.  
29. See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in 
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 27 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995). 
30. See generally Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL 
THEORIES OF RISK 83 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992) (describing theory 
and identifying key theoretical contributions to it). 
31. See MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS 54-68 (1970); see also Kahan & Braman, 
supra note 27, at 150-51. 
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individuals are responsible for securing their own well-being without collective 
assistance or interference.32 Persons who are “high grid” support a relatively 
hierarchical social order, in which goods, opportunities, offices, and obliga-
tions are distributed on the basis of largely fixed social attributes, such as gen-
der, ethnicity, lineage, and class. Persons who are “low grid” seek an egalitar-
ian society in which attributes of those sort play no role in the distribution of 
goods, opportunities, offices, obligations, and the like.33 These divisions are 
related to but cut across conventional left-right ideological classifications (such 
as “conservative” and “liberal”), and perform a more basic function than those 
schemes in orienting individuals’ political preferences.34 
Individuals, this work shows, form perceptions of risk that cohere with 
their cultural appraisals of putatively dangerous activities. Egalitarians and 
communitarians, for example, worry about environmental risks (nuclear power 
accidents, global warming, air pollution, etc.), the abatement of which would 
justify regulating commercial activities that generate inequality and legitimize 
the unconstrained pursuit of individual self-interest. 
Individualists, in contrast, reject claims of environmental risk precisely be-
cause they cherish markets and private orderings. They worry instead that ex-
cessive gun control will render individuals unable to defend themselves—a be-
lief congenial to the association of guns with individualist virtues such as self-
reliance, courage, and martial prowess. 
Hierarchists fret about the societal risks of drug use and promiscuous sex, 
and the personal risks associated with obtaining an abortion or smoking mari-
juana—forms of behavior that denigrate traditional, stratifying norms. For simi-
lar reasons, they worry that mandatory vaccination of school-age girls against 
the human papillomavirus (HPV) will induce young people to engage in higher 
rates of unprotected, premarital sex and thus increase the incidence of other 
sexually transmitted diseases.35 
 
32. See Rayner, supra note 30, at 86-88. 
33. See id.; JONATHAN L. GROSS & STEVE RAYNER, MEASURING CULTURE: A 
PARADIGM FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 6 (1985). 
34. See GROSS & RAYNER, supra note 33; Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by 
Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 3, 10-13 (1987); John Gastil, Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, The 
‘Wildavsky Heuristic’: The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion (Pub. L. & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 107, 2005) [hereinafter Gastil, 
Wildavsky], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=834264. 
35. This association, it turns out, is highly sensitive to the perceived cultural identity of 
the person who presents information about the HPV vaccine. A recent experimental 
investigation shows that the disposition of hierarchically inclined individuals to view the 
vaccine as risky can be substantially mitigated when they receive information about the risks 
and benefits of the vaccine from an expert whom such individuals perceive shares their 
values. See Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making 
Sense of—and Making Progress in—the American Culture War of Fact at 10-13 (Sept. 27, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017189. 
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Such associations,36 which researchers find explain risk perceptions more 
powerfully than any other individual characteristic,37 are the statistical smoking 
gun of cultural cognition. There is no reason to believe that hierarchs and indi-
vidualists have better or worse access to information about societal harms than 
egalitarians or communitarians, or that any one of them is more or less reliant 
on heuristics in interpreting such information. The only cogent explanation for 
the clustering of beliefs among persons who share such orientations is that cul-
ture is indeed entering into the cognitive processes that determine their percep-
tions of risk. 
A popular theme in the history and philosophy of science treats the ad-
vancement of human knowledge as conjoined to the adoption of liberal democ-
ratic institutions. It is through incessant exposure to challenge that facts estab-
lish themselves as worthy of belief under the scientific method. Liberal 
institutions secure the climate in which such constant challenging is most likely 
to take place, both by formally protecting the right of persons to espouse views 
at odds with dominant systems of belief and by informally habituating us to ex-
pect, tolerate, and even reward dissent.38 
But at the same time that liberalism advances science, it also ironically 
constrains it. The many truths that science has discovered depend on culture for 
their dissemination: without culture to identify which information purveyors 
are worthy of trust, we’d be powerless to avail ourselves of the vast stores of 
empirical knowledge that we did not personally participate in developing. But 
thanks to liberalism, we don’t all use the same culture to help us figure out 
 
36. Many of these risks, of course, are both conspicuous and conspicuously political. 
But even novel risks, associated with as yet unpoliticized activities, can readily generate 
these dynamics. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Affect, Values, and Nanotechnology Risk 
Perceptions: An Experimental Investigation (Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 
22, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968652. 
37. Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic, and I found these results in a pair of 
national studies of risk and culture, the findings of which are reported and discussed in 
Kahan et al., supra note 35; Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: 
Explaining the White Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 465 (2007) 
[hereinafter Kahan, Identity-Protective Cognition]; Gastil, Wildavsky, supra note 34; and 
generally at http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/. For studies reaching similar results, 
see Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of 
Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61 
(1991); Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Images 
of Nevada, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107 (James Flynn, Paul Slovic & Howard Kunreuther eds., 
2001); and Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting 
Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1427, 1445 (1996).  
38. This position is associated most famously with the work of Karl Popper. See KARL 
R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959) [hereinafter POPPER, LOGIC]; KARL 
R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966). But it is also featured 
prominently in Mill’s essay On Liberty. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Penguin 
Books 1982) (1859).  
KAHAN_FINAL_AUTHOR_RESPONSES.DOC 10/13/2007 8:51:44 AM 
Month 2007] THE COGNITIVELY ILLIBERAL STATE 111 
what or whom to believe. Our society features a plurality of cultural styles, and 
hence a plurality of cultural certifiers of credible information. 
Again, the belief that science will inevitably pull these cultural authorities 
into agreement with themselves reflects unwarranted optimism. In accord with 
its own professional norms and in harmony with the social norms of a liberal 
regime, the academy tolerates and even encourages competitive dissent.39 As a 
result, cultural advocates will always be able to find support from seemingly 
qualified experts for their perception that what’s ignoble is also dangerous, and 
what’s noble benign.40 States of persistent group polarization are thus inevita-
ble—almost mathematically so41—as beliefs feed on themselves within cultural 
groups, whose members stubbornly dismiss as unworthy insights originating 
outside the group. 
Because we have the advantage of science, we undoubtedly know more 
than previous ages about what actions to take to attain our collective well-
being. But precisely because we tolerate more cultural diversity than they did, 
we are also confronted with unprecedented societal dissensus on exactly what 
to do. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF COGNITIVE ILLIBERALISM 
This constraint on scientific enlightenment, in turn, constrains the progress 
of liberalism. The quieting of open and violent sectarian rivalries aimed at 
aligning the state with partisan cultural orthodoxies is liberalism’s great 
achievement.42 But those rivalries, cultural cognition suggests, have not been 
genuinely extinguished, only relocated; they persist, not so much in disputes 
over the morally sectarian visions to be expressed by the law, but in contesta-
tion over the means to be employed to attain society’s secular ends. 
This is the problem of cognitive illiberalism. I will now explore the two 
forms it takes in our political life: culturally grounded status conflict over the 
facts on which policies of harm abatement rest, and parallel conflict over whose 
view of the facts is being distorted by an illiberal desire to impose a partisan 
 
39. A scientific discovery’s constant openness to refutation, according to Popper’s 
influential account of the scientific method, see POPPER, LOGIC, supra note 38, is an essential 
condition of assent to it, a position that sociologists and science have linked to a professional 
culture of incessant competitive dissent within the scientific academy. See ROBERT K. 
MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 276, 277 
(Norman W. Storer ed., 1973) (identifying “organized skepticism” as “both a methodological 
and an institutional mandate”). As Wildavsky points out, “Disagreement over science is 
normal; the competition of ideas is what keeps it going.” AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT 
TRUE? A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 246 (1995). 
40. See generally DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, RISK, supra note 12, at 49-66. 
41. See generally Braman, Modeling Facts, supra note 23, at 294-97.  
42. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL 
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977); HOLMES, supra note 2, at 42-67. 
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cultural orthodoxy through law.43 
A. “Culture Wars”: Facts, Not Values 
Cultural status competition occupies a familiar place in our political life. 
Laws relating to gay marriage, flag burning, late-term abortion, the teaching of 
“intelligent design,” and the like provoke bitter conflict not so much because of 
their impact on behavior but because of the messages their adoption (or rejec-
tion) sends about the relative status of persons who subscribe to competing cul-
tural styles.44 There’s no disputing the affront to liberal neutrality posed by 
these sectarian efforts to capture the expressive capital of the law. The only de-
bate concerns the significance of these so-called “culture wars,” which political 
scientists assure us is of much greater concern to fringe political actors and 
journalists than to the average American voter.45 
The theory of cultural cognition, however, implies that it is a profound mis-
take to see cultural status competition as confined to so-called symbolic poli-
tics. Even if cultural contestation over values could magically be banished from 
our political life tomorrow, it would continue in empirical debates over how to 
make our society prosperous and safe—exactly the matters that “culture war” 
 
43. I am addressing primarily the impact of cognitive illiberalism on perceptions of 
facts relevant to policies adopted by legislatures or administrative tribunals. But certainly 
one would expect the same dynamics to shape perceptions of facts—whether by judges or 
juries, or by members of the public reacting to what judges and juries decide—in the judicial 
arena. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman & John Gastil, A Cultural Critique of Gun 
Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSS-ROADS OF GUN CONTROL 
AND MASS TORTS 105 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005). In an insightful article, Suzanne B. 
Goldberg has noted that when courts announce new constitutional rights against 
discrimination they invariably rely on factual claims relating either to the nature of the group 
being discriminated against or the rationale or consequences of the discriminatory policy 
being challenged. Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-
Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2006). Goldberg speculates that courts resort 
to “fact” claims strategically, in order to conceal their reliance on contentious norms. An 
alternative explanation would be cognitive: as judges’ commitment to particular norms shift, 
so do their perceptions of facts that either support or undermine discriminatory laws. Cf. Dan 
M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense (Aug. 29, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (presenting empirical evidence that 
individuals’ cultural norms shape their perception of facts in controversial self-defense 
cases).  
44. This theme is a common one in academic and popular writings. See, e.g., DON S. 
BROWNING ET AL., FROM CULTURE WAR TO COMMON GROUND (2d ed. 2000); JAMES 
DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991); PETER 
KREEF, HOW TO WIN THE CULTURE WAR: A CHRISTIAN BATTLE PLAN FOR A SOCIETY IN 
CRISIS (2002). For scholarly accounts of the nature of symbolic status competition in law, 
see JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN 
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986) and J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 
YALE L.J. 2313 (1997). 
45. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE 
WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2005).  
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critics say average citizens do care intensely about.46 
Indeed, the theory of cultural cognition helps us to see that debates over 
seemingly instrumental issues are of a piece with conflicts over so-called sym-
bolic ones. Debates over climate change, economic policy, public health, and 
crime control pit exactly the same cultural groups—hierarchical and egalitarian, 
individualistic and communitarian—against each other.47 
Such debates provoke the same acrimony as ones over symbolic issues. 
The rhetorically bloodless language of the experts—regression coefficients, 
GCM grid-box predictions, LARS-WG stochastic algorithms, t-statistics—does 
nothing to staunch accusations of deceit and bad faith: 
 Folks with their eyes even halfway on the ball already know that global 
warming is quackery gone to town and belongs on the dumb-idea ash-heap 
with previous enviro-alarms—see Alar, DDT, acid rain, asbestos, African kil-
ler bees, holes in the ozone layer, et al.—all whooped up as threats to life as 
we know it and all, in due course, proven to be either totally harmless or of not 
much account.48 
 
 You know, 15 percent of people believe the moon landing was staged on 
some movie lot and a somewhat smaller number still believe the Earth is flat. 
They get together on Saturday night and party with the global-warming den-
iers.49 
  
 These factually challenged bureau-rats in the legislature want to continue 
punishing the employer by passing new laws to continually raise wages in the 
private sector. These mental midgets claim this will benefit the worker. Noth-
ing like twisting logic upside down to get more votes.50 
 
 So why does the supply-side idea keep on resurfacing? Probably because 
of two key attributes that it shares with certain other doctrines, like belief in 
the gold standard: It appeals to the prejudices of extremely rich men, and it of-
 
46. In fact, the best explanation for the high profile of symbolic issues in electoral 
politics is that citizens who care mainly about safety and prosperity will, because of the 
heuristic role of culture, impute competence and shared interests to politicians who share 
their values on cultural issues. See generally Wildavsky, supra note 34 (articulating the 
theory); Gastil, Wildavsky, supra note 34 (presenting empirical support for the theory). In 
this sense, the journalists who infer that “culture outweighs economics as a matter of public 
concern,” THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? 6 (2004), and the political 
scientists who say culture is irrelevant are both wrong. See John Gastil, Dan M. Kahan & 
Don Braman, Ending Polarization: The Good News About the Culture Wars, BOSTON REV., 
Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 18. 
47. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.  
48. Larry Thornberry, Hot and Cool, AM. SPECTATOR ONLINE, Nov. 3, 2005, 
http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=8972 (reviewing MICHAEL CRICHTON, 
STATE OF FEAR (2004)). 
49. Alex Fryer, Gore Scoffs at Reichert’s Stance on Global Warming, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Oct. 25, 2006, at B1 (quoting Al Gore). 
50. Devvy Kidd, Solving the Minimum Wage Dilemma, NEWSWITHVIEWS.COM, Apr. 
16, 2003, http://www.newswithviews.com/Devvy/kidd13.htm. 
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fers self-esteem to the intellectually insecure. . . . Because economics touches 
so much of life, everyone wants to have an opinion. Yet the kind of economics 
covered in the textbooks is a technical subject that many people find hard to 
follow. How reassuring, then, to be told that it is all irrelevant—that all you 
really need to know are a few simple ideas. . . . Supply-side economics, then, 
is like one of those African viruses that, however often it may be eradicated 
from the settled areas, is always out there in the bush, waiting for new vic-
tims.51 
 
 Thanks to [the author of an op-ed discussing] the insanity of concealed gun 
laws. . . . It was particularly helpful that he exposed Professor John R. Lott Jr. 
as an intellectually dishonest toady of the bullet manufacturing industry. Gun 
nuts have been in our faces lately with his alleged study saying that not carry-
ing a gun made our streets unsafe. There’s a word for that kind of thinking—
Orwellian.52 
 
 What is it with these right-wing Christians? Faced with a choice between 
sex and death, they choose death every time. No sex ed or contraception for 
teens, no sex for the unwed, no condoms for gays, no abortion for anyone . . . . 
Ah, Christian compassion! Christian sadism, more likely.53 
Most important of all, conflicts over instrumental issues convey exactly the 
same messages about the status of the cultural groups they divide. If a particu-
lar activity (owning a gun, participating in commerce) is esteem-conferring for 
me because of my cultural commitments, I instinctively resent, and hence re-
sist, the claim that the activity is in fact dangerous and worthy of regulation.54 
If a particular activity (say, abortion) symbolically denigrates a cultural role 
that is esteem-conferring for me (motherhood), the conclusion that the activity 
is not dangerous and worthy of regulation provokes the same resentment.55 
If the government adopts a policy (on, say, climate change) that reflects a 
view of the facts contrary to the one espoused by my cultural peers and authori-
ties, I naturally view such action as implying that those whom I trust are in fact 
incompetent or untrustworthy. I am all the more impelled to that inference if 
the factual presuppositions of the policy are ones espoused by persons of a con-
 
51. Paul Krugman, Supply Side Virus Strikes Again: Why There Is No Cure for This 
Virulent Infection, SLATE, Aug. 16, 1996, http://www.slate.com/id/1910. 
52. Kevin Beck, Letter to Editor, Conceal Carry, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 12, 
1998, at B6. 
53. Katha Pollitt, Virginity or Death!, THE NATION, May 30, 2005, at 9, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050530/pollitt (on argument that mandatory HPV 
vaccination will endanger health by leading to teen pregnancies). 
54. See Kahan, Identity-Protective Cognition, supra note 37, at 479-88 (presenting 
empirical evidence showing that hierarchists and individualists are less likely to see 
commercial activities and guns as risky than others). 
55. See id. at 489-91 (empirical evidence that women who adhere to hierarchical 
worldview believe abortion presents a significant health risk to women); see also Reva B. 
Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion 
Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (documenting political prevalence of the “harm to 
women” argument in support of new abortion prohibitions). 
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trary persuasion (Rush Limbaugh; the editors of The New York Times), who 
tend to make no secret of their low regard for the character of persons who hold 
mine. 
Consider in this regard a YouTube video entitled, “Evangelist mom on 
global warming, evolution, creationism.”56 Excerpted from the documentary 
Jesus Camp, the clip shows a mother from rural St. Robert, Missouri, adminis-
tering a home-schooling lesson to her twelve-year-old son on the fallacies of 
global warming concern: 
Mother (reading): “‘One popular thing to do in American politics is to note 
that the summers in the United States over the past few years have been very 
warm; as a result, global warming must be real. What’s wrong with this rea-
soning?’” 
Son: “It’s only gone up 0.6 degrees.” 
Mother: “Yeah, it’s not really a big problem, is it?” 
Son: “I don’t think that it’s going to hurt us.” 
The son, who earlier was shown reading a textbook entitled Exploring 
Creation with Physical Science, asks whether “creationism” is as important an 
issue in American politics as global warming, to which the mother replies, “It’s 
becoming one, now.” “What if you had to go to a school where the teacher said, 
‘Creationism is stupid, and you’re stupid if you believe in it,’” the mother asks, 
eliciting a pained look from the boy. “Or what if you had to go to a school 
where your teacher said, ‘Evolution is stupid, and you’re stupid if you believe 
in it?” “I wouldn’t mind that!,” he chuckles. Later the mother asks a younger 
son, who nods, “Did you get to the part on here where it says science doesn’t 
prove anything? And it’s really interesting if you look at things that way.” “It 
is,” he replies. “I think, personally, that Galileo made the right choice by giving 
up science for Christ,” the boy says to the mother, over whose shoulder a pic-
ture of a smiling George Bush can be seen. The clip fades as the message “75% 
of homeschooled kids in the United States are Evangelical Christians” appears. 
The video succinctly captures the cultural significance of instrumental pol-
icy disputes in our political life. The mother clearly understands facts this way. 
For her, the debate over climate changes is of a piece with the debate over the 
teaching of evolution in public schools, most likely because of the conspicuous 
role that natural scientists from elite universities play in both. At stake—in both 
controversies—is the status of those who hold her values (“What if you had to 
go to a school where the teacher said, . . . ‘you’re stupid if you believe in [crea-
tionism]’?”). By exposing the supposed logical fallacies of those who fear 
global warming, and by showing that “science” can just as easily be used to 
support her group’s views on factual issues like climate change and the origin 
of the species, the mother teaches the son that it is the family’s cultural adver-
saries who are not merely mistaken but worthy of contempt (“‘you’re stupid if 
 
56.  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07WX3F7UQWA (last visited, Sept. 25, 
2007). 
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you believe in [evolution]’”). 
But more subtly the clip makes a similar point about the attitude of the 
mother’s cultural opponents. As it was no doubt designed to do, the clip pro-
vokes both scorn and alarm from online commenters: 
Poor cretins sometimes I wonder if they know that their delusional? BTW 
creationist[s] are stupid. 
There should be a law against “teaching” ignorance to those who cannot ac-
cept scientific fact! 
That women should be shot. 
Those are the kind people who should be neutered. 
These kids are our future. Scary.57 
Someone viewing the viewers of the video, then, sees that they, no less 
than the mother, are as invested in what the global warming debate signifies 
about the status of competing worldviews as in what it portends for the future 
of the planet.58 The commenters treat the factual beliefs espoused by the 
mother as justifying derision and even hate. The very vehemence of their ridi-
cule, moreover, betrays their own anxiety over what it would signify about their 
status were the law to come down on her side in the global warming debate. 
What we believe about facts, cultural cognition tells us, reflects who we 
are, culturally speaking. We are thus impelled to perceive the State’s adoption 
of instrumental policies, no less than its adoption of symbolic ones, as adjudi-
cating the competence and virtue of those who adhere to competing cultural 
outlooks. 
B. Now You See It, Now You Don’t 
Cognitive illiberalism is not invisible to us. But we do perceive it selec-
tively. 
Imagine persons forbidden to engage in a species of behavior that is inte-
gral to their understanding of the good life but that is widely viewed as morally 
abhorrent. Such a group is unlikely to be mollified by the explanation that the 
State enacted the prohibition because a majority of citizens believed the behav-
ior posed grave risks of harm to society. In that case, the dissenting minority 
will not only perceive a law motivated by fear to be equivalent in its impact to a 
law motivated by disgust; its members will also suspect that the majority’s dis-
gust is what disposed it to be fearful. Social psychologists have documented 
 
57. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07WX3F7UQWA (comments) (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2007). 
58. The YouTube posting is designated as a response to a video entitled “Atheists 
Attacked in America,” which excerpts a news story on persecution of atheists in a small rural 
town. It therefore seems likely that the poster, far from intending to invite ridicule of the 
mother, actually meant to make viewers aware of the persecution that evangelicals 
experience through depictions such as this one, which so predictably evoke ridicule of them. 
The disturbingly hateful response of the YouTube commentators drives this point home. 
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that persons readily, and correctly, discern that individuals who hold factual be-
liefs different from their own have formed those views to fit their group com-
mitments.59 
The complaint that their perception of harm is motivated by animus is 
unlikely to have much impact on members of the majority, however. The same 
research that shows that people often discern the effect of group commitments 
on the factual views of others finds that people usually don’t discern the distort-
ing effect of such commitments on their own beliefs. Social psychologists call 
this dynamic “naïve realism.”60 
This experience—of simultaneously perceiving and not perceiving cogni-
tive illiberalism—is a ubiquitous feature of our political experience. Because 
our society is genuinely pluralistic, nearly every citizen belongs simultaneously 
to (potentially shifting) majorities and minorities in moral debates. As a result, 
we can all identify some species of regulation we object to on the ground that 
its secular rationale is either a pretext for, or a rationalization of, aversion to 
disfavored values. And by the same token, we all support regulations the secu-
lar justifications for which are perceived by others as pretexts or rationaliza-
tions. 
Disputes over who is being “realistic” and who “naïve” about the relation-
ship between cultural commitments and perceptions of harm is another familiar 
form of illiberal status competition in our society. To illustrate its ubiquity, I 
will consider how egalitarians and hierarchs, individualists and communi-
tarians, take turns advancing and denying charges of cognitive illiberalism 
across a diverse set of issues. 
1. Sodomy and drugs 
Both same-sex intimacy and the use of (certain) recreational drugs are 
deeply woven into visions of the good life that defy traditional, largely hierar-
chical norms. For that reason, these forms of behavior provoke revulsion 
among hierarchically inclined persons.61 Egalitarians and individualists, in 
turn, have invoked liberal values to attack antisodomy and drug laws, depicting 
 
59. See Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Actual Versus 
Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 
68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404-05 (1995). 
60. See id. 
61. On homosexuality and hierarchical norms, see generally Gregory M. Herek, 
Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Bisexual Men and Women in the United States, 39 J. SEX 
RES. 264 (2002); Bernard E. Whitley, Jr. & Sara E. Lee, The Relationship of 
Authoritarianism and Related Constructs to Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, 30 J. APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 144 (2000). On drugs, see DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: 
ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL (1973); Douglas Clark Kinder, Shutting Out the Evil: 
Nativism and Narcotics Control in the United States, in DRUG CONTROL POLICY: ESSAYS IN 
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 117 (William O. Walker III ed., 1992).  
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them as the equivalent of cultural alien and sedition acts.62 
It would be a mistake, though, to infer that moral aversion to the values 
same-sex sodomy and drugs respectively express has ever been offered as the 
sole basis for prohibiting them. Instead, consistent with the cultural cognition 
of harm, proponents of regulation have always rested their case on (or at least 
amply fortified it with) the contribution such laws make to avoiding secular 
harms. It is said, for example, that drug use generates crime, leads to mental 
and physical disorders (which nonusers end up paying to treat), detracts from 
worker productivity (visiting economic losses on society at large), and inter-
feres with responsible parenting.63 Before being struck down as unconstitu-
tional in Lawrence v. Texas,64 same-sex sodomy laws were defended on the 
ground that homosexuality spreads disease, conduces to child molestation, and 
risks social disorder.65 
Sodomy and drug law opponents have never simply taken these harm ra-
tionales at face value. Instead, they have tested them with a series of argumen-
tative techniques aimed at showing that they are either the product of bad faith 
or delusion. 
One of these is akin to an evidentiary burden of proof. “[M]ost philoso-
phers”—or at least most liberal ones—“begin with a ‘presumption of freedom,’ 
 
62. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Privacy and Homosexual Love, 14 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 895 (1986) [hereinafter Richards, Privacy]. 
 Enforcement of traditional attitudes on society at large is, as I have suggested, the 
functional equivalent of a heresy prosecution: the grounds for prohibition are highly 
personal, ideological and/or political. . . .  
 Homosexuality is today essentially a form of political, social, and moral dissent on a par 
with the best American traditions of dissent and even subversive advocacy. For this reason, 
traditional liberal principles must protect this way of life from the worst American impulses 
of repressive nativism. Those that support criminalization find today in homosexuality what 
they found before in the family planning of Sanger, the atheism of Darwin, the socialism of 
Debs, or the Marxist advocacy of the American Communist Party. 
Id. at 905; see also DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION (1982) [hereinafter RICHARDS, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION]. 
[T]he perfectionist ideal, implicit in America’s prohibitory drug laws, is Manichean. Drug 
users are branded as the Puritans branded their deviants: evil and willful outcasts whose 
criminal stigma reflects the demarcation between the ideals of the saints and the inexplicable 
and satanic evils of the sinner. We have disclosed this cruel vision for what it is: not a critical 
moral judgment, but a remnant of a sectarian ideology secularized into a moral ideal of 
emotional self-control. 
Id. at 194; cf. STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING 
OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 158 (1994). 
63. See generally MUSTO, supra note 61 (cataloging an evolving list of asserted harms 
over time). 
64. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
65. See generally Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare 
Assertions of “Public Morality” Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the 
Purposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 146 (1998) (canvassing such 
rationales); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., “DISHONORABLE PASSIONS”: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
THE CRIME AGAINST NATURE (forthcoming Feb. 2008). 
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or liberty, which places the onus of justification on those who would interfere 
with what a person wants to do.”66 Dire speculations unsupported by empirical 
evidence—such as Lord Devlin’s “social disintegration thesis,”67 or the claim 
that homosexual sodomy leads to child molestation68—are clearly inadequate 
to discharge this justificatory burden. But so too are harm-prevention rationales 
supported by reasonably disputed empirical evidence. In the face of reasonable 
“scientific doubts” about the public health and safety effects of marijuana use69 
and “volumes [of writings] supporting one hypothesis or another” on the effects 
of drug laws in combating crime,70 the presumption of liberty should prevail. 
Another technique focuses less on the weight of the evidence supporting 
the secular rationales for regulation than on the plausibility of them as motiva-
tions for regulation. Drug use is less dangerous than a host of other activities, 
from motorcycle riding to mountain climbing to alcohol consumption. If they 
were truly motivated by the threat that drugs pose to public health, prohibition-
ists would be just as intent on banning these other activities.71 Likewise, if the 
defenders of same-sex sodomy laws had been genuinely concerned to prevent 
the spread of AIDS, they’d have been just as intent on regulating heterosexual 
as homosexual sodomy—and would actually have had no interest in regulating 
lesbian sex.72 Indeed, they’d actually support homosexual marriage, which 
conduces to monogamy and hence to the reduction of sexually transmitted dis-
eases.73 
The selectivity with which they are applied, critics conclude, reveals that 
the harm-prevention rationales for drug and antisodomy laws are nothing more 
than “post hoc empirical makeweights for . . . moralistic and paternalistic ar-
 
66. DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS 59 (1992). 
67. Compare PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13 (1965) (defending 
criminalization of homosexuality on ground that society will “disintegrate” without 
enforcement of core moral norms), with Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement 
of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 992 (1966) (“[Devlin] manages this conclusion without 
offering evidence that homosexuality presents any danger at all to society’s existence, 
beyond the naked claim that all ‘deviations from a society’s shared morality . . . are capable 
in their nature of threatening the existence of society’ . . . .”), and H.L.A. Hart, Social 
Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13 (1967) (“Till 
psychologists and sociologists provide evidence, supporters of the enforcement of morality 
would do better to rest their case candidly on [the legitimacy of enforcing morality for its 
own sake] rather than on the disintegration thesis.”). 
68. See THE EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE 
LAW 19 (1990); Richards, Privacy, supra note 62, at 901. 
69. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975) (citing “scientific doubts” as 
reason to reject conflicting empirical evidence offered to support state claim that marijuana 
use in one’s home creates public health and safety risks). 
70. HUSAK, supra note 66, at 196. 
71. See id. at 94-97; DUKE & GROSS, supra note 62, at 147-51. 
72. See HARVARD LAW REVIEW EDITORS, supra note 68, at 19-20; see also Gryczan v. 
Montana, 942 P.2d 112, 124 (Mont. 1997). 
73. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL 
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 120 (1996). 
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guments.”74 Because they so plainly lack support and cogency, these rationales, 
even if honestly believed by their deluded sponsors, do nothing, critics main-
tain, to acquit such laws of the charge that they are the instruments of cultural 
orthodoxy.75 
2. Guns 
The liberal case against sodomy and drug laws—including the probing of 
secular rationales for hidden, illiberal motivations—furnishes a template for 
challenging myriad other regulations aimed at culturally contested forms of be-
havior. One of these is gun control. 
Many of the same persons who oppose drug criminalization and who his-
torically fought antisodomy laws support various forms of gun control. Gun 
control supporters base their case on the abatement of secular harms: firearms 
accidents, particularly ones involving children, and the use of guns to commit 
violent crimes. It remains the case, however, that gun possession, like drug use 
and sodomy, is a form of behavior that defies certain cultural norms, in this 
case egalitarian and communitarian ones, the holders of which despise guns as 
symbols of patriarchy and racism, indifference and distrust.76 Because this is 
so, gun control critics (many of whom believe that drugs and homosexuality are 
dangerous) have interrogated the arguments of gun control proponents with the 
very same techniques used to disclose cognitive illiberalism in the case for 
regulating sodomy and drug use. 
For them, at least, such probing likewise reveals the influence of partisan 
values on their opponents’ beliefs. As with drug prohibition, no form of gun 
control has been conclusively proven to be effective, despite prodigious em-
pirical investigation.77 Conveniently (but not surprisingly)78 for gun control 
opponents, the array of authorities who’ve reached this conclusion include 
many highly credentialed scientists. A review by the Centers for Disease Con-
trol, for example, “found insufficient evidence to determine the effectiveness of 
any of the firearms laws reviewed,” which included licensing and registration 
requirements, waiting periods, lock-box provisions, and outright bans.79 On the 
 
74. RICHARDS, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 62, at 168. 
75. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 52 (1963) (concluding that 
Devlin’s social disintegration thesis trades on the “tacit identification of a society with its 
shared morality”); cf. HUSAK, supra note 66, at 157, 164-70 (concluding that empirical 
“harm” arguments offered by drug prohibitionists are not independent—analytically or 
motivationally—of belief that drug use is immoral). 
76. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
456-58 (1999). 
77. See generally JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? (2002) (reviewing 
evidence on various sorts of gun control and finding nothing works). 
78. See supra note 39 (discussing inevitability of scientific dissensus). 
79. ROBERT A. HAHN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FIRST REPORTS 
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING VIOLENCE: FIREARMS 
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specific impact of “concealed carry” laws—an issue on which there has been 
extensive empirical study80—a National Academy of Sciences review panel 
concluded that “with the current evidence it is not possible to determine that 
there is a causal link between the passage of right-to-carry laws and crime 
rates”—in either direction.81 If they won’t concede that there are at least le-
gitimate “scientific doubts” that gun control promotes pubic safety, or are un-
willing to apply “the presumption of liberty” in the face of such uncertainty, 
gun control supporters, it is said, must be biased by their moral aversion to gun 
ownership.82 
The asserted harm-based rationales for restricting guns, like those offered 
for prohibiting sodomy and recreational drug use, are also underinclusive. Con-
trol advocates, for example, prominently emphasize the risk of accidental 
shootings, particularly of children. Overall, guns rank fifteenth among causes 
of accidental death in the U.S., accounting for about 800 deaths, or 1% of the 
nationwide total, per year.83 Automobile accidents, the leading cause, account 
for more than 40,000 deaths.84 But gun control advocates aren’t lobbying for 
lower speed limits or tougher automobile “crashworthiness” standards, policies 
that would clearly be more effective than gun control in saving lives. Some six 
times as many children under ten years of age drown in swimming pools every 
year as are shot by guns; based on the relative number of guns and pools, Uni-
versity of Chicago economist Steven Levitt (an expert scientist, no?) calculated 
that having a swimming pool in one’s backyard is a hundred times more lethal 
for a child than having a gun somewhere inside one’s home.85 Yet no gun con-
trol advocacy group has called for banning swimming pools. 
Control advocates also emphasize the public health costs associated with 
shootings, both intentional and accidental. But those costs (like the costs asso-
 
LAWS (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5214a2.htm. 
80. Compare, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING 
CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS (2d ed. 2000) (presenting data that “concealed carry laws” 
reduce crime), with Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less 
Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202 (2003) (reexamining and extending Lott 
data and concluding: “While we do not want to overstate the strength of the conclusions that 
can be drawn from the extremely variable results emerging from the statistical analysis, if 
anything, there is stronger evidence for the conclusion that these laws increase crime than 
there is for the conclusion that they decrease it.”). 
81. COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. AND DATA ON FIREARMS, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 150 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 
2004) [hereinafter FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE].  
82. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., THE BIAS AGAINST GUNS: WHY ALMOST EVERYTHING 
YOU'VE HEARD ABOUT GUN CONTROL IS WRONG (2003) (arguing that most academics and 
journalists slant their information on guns); HARRY L. WILSON, GUNS, GUN CONTROL, AND 
ELECTIONS: THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF FIREARMS 244-45 (2006) (presenting evidence of 
media bias).  
83. See WILSON, supra note 82, at, at 51. 
84. See id.  
85. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST 
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 149-50 (2005).  
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ciated with illegal drug use) are swamped by those associated with alcohol: al-
cohol appears to be responsible for up to six times as many deaths as guns.86 
Even these figures probably understate the danger of alcohol relative to guns 
insofar as over half of the individuals who die from shootings are suicide vic-
tims,87 some fraction of whom would presumably have taken their lives by 
other means had they not had access to a gun.88 Nevertheless, control advocates 
aren’t proposing prohibition of alcohol. 
They might explain their focus on gun rather than alcohol regulation by cit-
ing the precedent of Prohibition, which (it is said) not only failed to reduce the 
incidence of drinking but generated terrifyingly high rates of collateral crime—
lessons that are often cited by those who oppose drug criminalization.89 But in 
a nation in which there are already more guns than people, there’s just as much 
reason to believe that gun prohibition can’t work and will in fact also ignite—
indeed, already has ignited—a violent black market.90 Why do the same people 
who so readily recite the “perversity” and “futility” of drug or alcohol prohibi-
tions so confidently deny the same for gun prohibitions?91 
For gun control opponents, the answer is (in effect) cognitive illiberalism. 
Control advocates selectively accept evidence of the need and feasibility of gun 
control because gun ownership, unlike swimming in backyard pools and drink-
ing beer, offends their values. “[T]he impetus to banning firearms comes less 
from a belief that it will reduce crime than from a cultural and moral opposition 
to them. . . . In this view prohibition is desirable even though ineffective, be-
cause it brands the banned conduct . . . as loathsome and immoral.”92 
 
86. Compare PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS 140 
(2000) (30,000 gun deaths), with HUSAK, supra note 66, at 95 (200,000 alcohol deaths). 
87. See ROBERT N. ANDERSON ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DEATHS: INJURIES, 
2001 at 21 (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_21acc.pdf. 
88. See WILSON, supra note 82, at 58-59.  
89. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS! THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZING 
DRUGS 159-60 (2002).  
90. See generally JACOBS, supra note 77, at viii-ix (“Interestingly, many gun control 
believers are atheists when it comes to government regulation of mood- and mind-altering 
drugs. They insist that drugs cannot be kept out of the hands of those who want to use them. . 
. . As we shall see, the challenge of regulating firearms is much greater than the challenge of 
regulating marijuana, cocaine, [and] heroin . . . .”). 
91. Compare Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, “Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy”: An 
Economic Analysis of the Attack on Gun Control, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1996) 
(concluding that stricter gun control can work), with Philip J. Cook, Book Revew, 21 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 303, 303 (2002) (describing the “war on drugs” as “costly, 
damaging, and ultimately absurd”). 
92. Don B. Kates, Jr., Public Opinion: The Effects of Extremist Discourse on the Gun 
Debate, in THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE 93, 95 (Don B. Kates, Jr. & Gary Kleck eds., 
1997).  
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3. Smoking 
The regulation of smoking also excites charges of cognitive illiberalism. 
Defenders of hefty sales taxes, public smoking bans, and other restrictions 
(many arising from settlement of the historic governmental lawsuit against the 
tobacco industry) invoke secular rationales: reducing the public health costs of 
treating lung cancer victims, and abating the risk of disease or the simple an-
noyance associated with ingesting “second-hand smoke.”93 But behind these 
rationales opponents detect the unmistakable signature of animus toward the 
cultural values that smoking expresses. 
The social meaning of smoking has undergone immense transformation in 
the last three decades. The broad appeal of smoking for the much of the twenti-
eth century was underwritten by a mélange of symbolic connotations—“the in-
dependent Marlboro Man” and “liberated Virginia Slim”;94 “‘continental’ so-
phistication” and “outright rebelliousness”95—that made cigarettes congenial to 
a diverse array of cultural styles. Today, however, cigarettes bear a more uni-
vocal, individualistic connotation. That meaning continues to resonate for a cul-
tural style that prizes the “authenticity of impulse and risk.”96 But for others, 
the individualistic aura of the cigarette denotes a constellation of negative val-
ues, such as weakness, crudeness, and irrationality, along with a culpable heed-
lessness of social obligation.97 
Changing the meaning of smoking was an essential element of the public 
campaign to reduce cigarette use in the United States. In the aftermath of the 
Surgeon General’s Report in 1964, public health officials focused mainly on 
disseminating information on the deleterious effect of cigarettes for smokers. 
Progress was slow. Cigarette consumption actually continued to climb through 
the end of the 1970s; efforts to push regulation beyond the requirement of 
warnings and the ban on television advertising stalled, as did a series of con-
sumer lawsuits against tobacco companies. But then public health officials and 
anti-cigarette activists adopted a new strategy: “to make smoking so unpopular 
that smokers would be forced to quit.”98 “The stigmatization of the cigarette” 
proved a breath of fresh air to the anti-tobacco movement.99 Not only did ciga-
rette consumption and lung-cancer rates begin to drop precipitously, but the na-
 
93. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The 
Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998). 
94. Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette, Risk, and American Culture, 119 DAEDALUS 155, 
169 (1990). 
95. Joseph R. Gusfield, The Social Symbolism of Smoking and Health, in SMOKING 
POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 49, 52 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 
1993).  
96. Id. at 66. 
97. Id. at 61, 62-63; Brandt, supra note 94, at 169. 
98. Constance A. Nathanson, Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy Change: The 
Case of Smoking and Guns, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 421, 436 (1999). 
99. Brandt, supra note 94, at 168-69. 
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tion witnessed a new wave of regulation. Localities and businesses began to 
adopt progressively more expansive public smoking bans, and Congress codi-
fied the terms of the governmental lawsuit filed to hold tobacco companies re-
sponsible for the public health cost of treating smoking illnesses.100 
The career of smoking in the United States powerfully confirms the dy-
namics of cultural cognition. As a later Surgeon General recognized in retro-
spect, “the diffusion of new knowledge [embodied in the 1964 Surgeon Gen-
eral’s Report] was impeded by the entrenched norm of smoking, a widespread 
practice fueled by the persistent and pervasive marketing of cigarettes.”101 A 
broad majority of citizens (including doctors, who also initially remained skep-
tical)102 did ultimately come to believe the empirical information synthesized 
in the Report, but only after a shift in social meaning—one that stamped 
“smoking . . . as undesirable, deviant behavior, and smokers as social mis-
fits”—made acceptance of that information compatible with a diverse array of 
cultural outlooks.103 Characteristic of the cultural cognition of harm, moreover, 
once smoking came to be seen as morally noxious, the public quickly came to 
believe that cigarettes were dangerous not only to smokers but to society at 
large.104 
It is exactly this historical connection between moral aversion to smoking 
and the regulation of it that has moved critics to hunt for evidence of bias. Like 
the opponents of drug laws, antisodomy laws, and gun control, moreover, 
they’ve had little trouble raising reasonable doubts about the substance and 
genuineness of proponents’ perceptions of third-party harms. 
One study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, for exam-
ple, concluded that smokers actually decrease public health costs.105 The 
health-care expenditures externalized by smokers, the researchers concluded, 
are more than offset by those externalized by nonsmokers, who tend to live 
longer and ultimately die from diseases that consume more resources to treat. 
At a minimum, “inevitable arbitrariness concerning what costs to include, 
which discount rate to apply, and what duration of follow-up to use” render any 
“economic method of evaluation” indeterminate.106 Applying the presumption 
of liberty, then, one might conclude that this secular rationale for regulation—
the lynchpin of the governmental lawsuit against the tobacco industry—is in-
 
100. See Nathanson, supra note 98, at 432-37.  
101. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 40 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT].  
102. See id. at 42.  
103. Gerald E. Markle & Ronald J. Troyer, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette 
Smoking as Deviant Behavior, 26 SOC. PROBS. 611, 617 (1979). 
104. See 2000 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 45-50; Nathanson, supra 
note 98, at 448-50. 
105. See Jan J. Barendregt, Luc Bonneux & Paul J. van der Maas, The Health Care 
Costs of Smoking, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1052 (1997).  
106. Id. at 1057. 
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sufficiently supported to justify high consumer taxes and other coercive restric-
tions. 
In addition, like the secular rationales for regulating drugs, same-sex sod-
omy, and guns, the rationales for public smoking bans are over-inclusive. There 
are (of course) scientifically credible grounds for doubting the claims of harm 
attributed to passive smoke ingestion in enclosed, not to mention open-air, pub-
lic facilities.107 But however sound, no study suggests that allowing smoking 
patrons of a bar to light up creates nearly as much danger for nonsmoking pa-
trons as permitting both to drink at such an establishment does for members of 
the public, who as a result face an increased risk of being killed by intoxicated 
drivers. Why so much less solicitude for the latter, who have so much less con-
trol over the risk they are being exposed to than do consumers who want to 
avoid smoky restaurants and bars? If smoking weren’t banned at the workplace, 
employees could still choose not to work at firms that don’t have privately en-
forced bans; why so much more solicitude for these risk-averse individuals than 
for persons who work in jobs that expose them to obviously greater hazards and 
whom we expect to protect themselves through market self-help?108 Why con-
sider banning drivers from smoking but not from listening to music when stud-
ies show that the distraction associated with adjusting a radio or CD player re-
sults in twelve times as many accidents as lighting up on the road?109 
For critics of smoking regulation, the answer to these questions is again the 
unstated, and maybe even unappreciated influence, of regulators’ moral aver-
sion to smoking. Antismokers, one such critic writes, bridle at the style of “the 
entrepreneurial businessman and others . . . who promote, celebrate, engage in, 
reward, and profit from daring and passionate risk-courting (or gambling) and 
bold and creative individualism.”110 They “find the choice to smoke, its array 
of sensual and social pleasures, and its deliberate courting of death to be per-
verse, incomprehensible, and alien.”111 “It is one of the peculiarities of pater-
nalism in the modern liberal state that its charges of perversion are described in 
rationalist, consequentialist terms, with scientific evidence adduced for its con-
 
107. See generally Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Smoking Bans, 13 MO. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 94, 109-11 (2005).  
108. See id. at 111-12. 
109. Compare Patrick McGeehan, A Politician Opposed to Smoke-Filled Rooms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at 14NJ4 (reporting pending legislation to ban smoking in cars to 
reduce distraction-related accidents), with Jane C. Stutts, Testimony for Presentation at the 
Subcommittee on Highways and Transit Hearing on Driver Distractions: Electronic Devices 
in the Automobile, available at http://www.hsrc.unc.edu/safety_info/distracted_drowsy/ 
congressional_testimony.cfm (reporting study results showing that 11.4% of distraction-
related accidents involve use of CD or cassette player, 0.9% smoking).  
110. Ken I. Kersch, Smoking, Progressive Liberalism, and the Law, 16 CRITICAL REV. 
405, 410 (2004). 
111. Id.; see also Wendy Koch, Smoking Bans Going from Inside Out, USA TODAY, 
July 13, at 1A (reporting response of opponent of outdoor smoking bans: “What’s driving 
outdoor bans . . . is ‘public hate of anything smoking or smoker-related.’”). 
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clusions.”112 
4. Nuclear energy & global warming 
Environmentalism has been a prime target for charges of cognitive illiber-
alism since the publication of Douglas’s and Wildavsky’s classic, Culture and 
Risk. Their main example was nuclear power. Atomic energy, they observed, 
excited impassioned opposition not just as a potentially hazardous “technology 
[but] as the manifestation of undemocratic unresponsiveness to individual 
needs within American society.”113 The industry had been borne of an incestu-
ous coupling of industry and governmental elites; it portended centralized pri-
vate control over a vital resource; it was stigmatized by the association of split-
ting atoms with an unprecedented threat to the future of human civilization.114 
These conditions made it possible for egalitarian activisits to “concentrate[] all 
social, economic and political issues into the nuclear debate,” from disparities 
in wealth, to discrimination against minorities, to global imperialism and the 
superpower arms race.115 
The book chronicled, too, nuclear critics’ selective and casual use of scien-
tific data.116 Despite their professed concern with the environment, the critics 
remained studiously oblivious to the evidence, advanced by credible scientific 
sources as early as the 1970s, that nuclear power was less damaging to the en-
vironment than the fossil fuel energy sources to which it was an alternative.117 
Putting two and two together, it became obvious, at least to Douglas and Wil-
davsky, that the perception of nuclear risks was a product of “cultural bias” on 
the part of egalitarian collectivists whose “sectarian” worldview would be af-
firmed by the gutting of the nuclear industry.118 
For understandable reasons the book was denounced as a polemic by envi-
ronmentalists.119 But to any discerning reader, it should have been clear that 
Risk and Culture’s account of “cultural bias” in risk perceptions supplied the 
materials for just as devastating an indictment of nuclear power’s defenders. In 
the same way that environmental risk-sensitivity was congenial to an egalitar-
ian and collectivist cultural style, so risk dismissiveness suited the needs of the 
 
112. Kersch, supra note 110, at 407. 
113. DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, RISK, supra note 12, at 149. 
114. See id. at 61, 149-50.  
115. Id. at 150.  
116. See id. at 59-61.  
117. See Gerald Steinberg, Book Review, 46 J. POL. 313, 313-14 (1984) (noting 
argument to this effect, made in 1979, by Nobel physicist Hans Bethe). 
118. See DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 12, at 150.  
119. See Langdon Winner, Pollution as Delusion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1982, at BR8 
(book review) (describing the reviewed book as an “ill-conceived polemic” and “shabby 
political critique”); see also E. Donald Elliott, Anthropologizing Environmentalism, 92 YALE 
L.J. 888 (1983) (book review) (“The attempt to ‘explain’ environmentalism makes a few 
good points, but on the whole this part of the book is crude, shortsighted, and snide.”). 
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“market individualist,” whose reverence for private orderings predisposed him 
to a belief in the resilience of nature and the evolutionary wisdom of mar-
kets.120 
What nuclear power was to egalitarian collectivists of the 1970s and 1980s, 
global warming is to contemporary hierarchical individualists. Just as opposi-
tion to nuclear power permitted the former to take a “global stand against evil 
in all its forms,”121 so skepticism toward global warming supplies a symbolic 
focal point for a wide range of positions advocated by the latter. Because poli-
cies like the Kyoto Protocol would impose disproportionate burdens on the 
U.S. economy, global warming concern is attacked as a ploy to effect “wealth 
redistribution.”122 U.N. sponsorship of initiatives to address global warming 
forms a rhetorical bridge between climate-change skepticism and a hawkish 
stance on issues of foreign policy.123 The prominence of scientific elites in such 
initiatives makes dismissal of this risk dovetail with resentment toward the 
secularization of public school education, including the teaching of evolu-
tion.124 Insofar as many political action groups concerned with global warming 
also support women’s rights and planned-parenting policies, the assault on 
“global warming hysteria” even ties into opposition to abortion.125 Douglas and 
Wildavsky questioned whether the popular critics of nuclear power could really 
understand the science involved; does anyone think Michael Crichton and the 
 
120. See DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, RISK, supra note 12, at 99; see also MICHAEL 
THOMPSON, RICHARD ELLIS & AARON WILDAVSKY, CULTURAL THEORY 28 (1990) (“For 
individualism to be a viable way of life, nature must be a skill-controlled cornucopia.”).  
121. DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, RISK, supra note 12, at 150.  
122. See, e.g., Joseph Klein, Hot Air from the UN, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, Nov. 
20, 2006, http://www.frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=25574 (“[T]he 
UN’s idea of a ‘truly global response’ to the problem of global warming follows its same old 
self-righteous paths—extending the Kyoto Protocol’s mandatory emission quotas beyond 
2012, instituting global taxes to distribute wealth from the industrialized West to developing 
countries, and scaring our kids with misleading information about the terrible ills inflicted on 
the sacred Earth by us rich greedy Westerners.”) 
123. See, e.g., Senator James Inhofe, Chairman, Senate Env’t & Pub. Works Comm., 
Hot and Cold Media Spin: A Challenge to Journalists Who Cover Global Warming (Sept. 
25, 2006), available at http://epw.senate.gov/speechitem.cfm?party=rep&id=263759 
(“French President Jacques Chirac provided the key clue as to why so many in the 
international community still revere the Kyoto Protocol, who in 2000 said Kyoto represents 
‘the first component of an authentic global governance.’”). 
124. See Susan Paynter, Glare of Global-Warming Attention Creates a Hot Seat in 
Federal Way, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 22, 2007, at E1 (reporting opposition of 
parents who favor teaching of creationism to showing of Al Gore’s global warming 
documentary in public school). 
125. See INST. ON RELIGION & DEMOCRACY & ACTON INST. FOR THE STUDY OF 
RELIGION & LIBERTY, FROM CLIMATE CONTROL TO POPULATION CONTROL: TROUBLING 
BACKGROUND ON THE “EVANGELICAL CLIMATE INITIATIVE” 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.acton.org/pdf/fcctpc.pdf (“Why would a pro-abortion foundation want to fund an 
evangelical effort to fight global warming? Is there a connection between these efforts? 
There is. And that connection should trouble all evangelicals, especially those who endorsed 
the Evangelical Climate Initiative.”). 
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admirers of his novel, State of Fear, can decipher the models and equations of 
the scientists who dispute the dangers of global warming?126 It’s obvious, at 
least to persons of an egalitarian or communitarian sensibility, that those who 
oppose policies to abate global warming risks are motivated to do so by their 
desire to visit an expressive defeat on their cultural adversaries. 
But were it not for the dynamic of naïve realism, it would be just as obvi-
ous to egalitarians and communitarians that their support for such policies re-
flects exactly the same motivations. Precisely because global warming skepti-
cism synthesizes so broad an array of individualistic and hierarchical themes, 
the campaign to elevate climate change into an issue of paramount public con-
cern furnishes a uniquely potent vehicle for demonizing greedy individualists 
and ridiculing unenlightened, reactionary hierarchs.127 Even assuming they are 
right, those who applaud Al Gore’s movie don’t have any better an understand-
ing of the science involved than those who celebrate Crichton’s novel; they, 
too, are relying on cultural affinity to decide whom to believe. 
Properly understood, Douglas and Wildavsky’s account of environmental 
politics is not a critique of any one cultural outlook. It is an indictment of an 
entire mode of political discourse that makes citizens of all persuasions oblivi-
ous to the impact of cultural values on their perceptions of harm and thus to the 
barrier that cultural cognition poses to realization of a genuinely liberal state. 
III. A DISCOURSE NORM SOLUTION      
For a quarter century the use of discourse norms has figured conspicuously 
in liberal political theory. Constraining what political actors say about law, on 
this view, is as critical as constraining what they actually do with it.128 In order 
for us to experience law as respectful of moral autonomy, legislators, judges, 
and ordinary citizens must avoid publicly justifying their policy preferences on 
 
126. See MICHAEL CRICHTON, STATE OF FEAR (2004).  
127. See, e.g., Eric Bates & Jeff Goodell, “The Revolution is Beginning,” ROLLING 
STONE, June 28, 2007, at 50, 51 (“Bush . . . does what Exxon-Mobil wants, every single 
time. . . . Who would [Cheney and Bush] choose to rely on as the source of the best 
information about global warming? Exxon-Mobil, of course.” (quoting Al Gore)). 
Wildavsky, for example, is reported to have called global warming “the mother of all 
environmental scares.” Richard S. Lindzen, Global Warming: The Origin and Nature of the 
Alleged Scientific Consensus, 15 REG. 87 (1992), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv15n2/reg15n2g.html. Wildavsky stated: 
Warming (and warming alone), through its primary antidote of withdrawing carbon from 
production and consumption, is capable of realizing the environmentalist’s dream of an 
egalitarian society based on rejection of economic growth in favor of a smaller population’s 
eating lower on the food chain, consuming a lot less, and sharing a much lower level of 
resources much more equally. 
Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
128. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 6 (“[W]e must learn to think of liberalism as a 
way of talking about power, a form of political culture.”).  
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grounds distinctive of any particular view of the good life.129 
Liberal theorists are right, I will argue, to focus on discourse norms but 
wrong, as a psychological matter, to think that denuding the law of cultural 
resonances is the best way to assure citizens that the law respects their identi-
ties. On the contrary, a discourse norm that enjoins precisely the opposite—that 
citizens strive to infuse law with as many diverse and competing cultural mean-
ings as it can possibly bear—is the best way to mitigate (if not solve) the prob-
lem of cognitive illiberalism. 
A. Against Public Reason 
Arguably the most systematic and influential account of liberal discourse 
norms is Rawls’s principle of “public reason.” To conform their advocacy to 
“public reason,” those debating social policy must refrain from appealing to 
“comprehensive views”—moral systems that “include[] conceptions of what is 
of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character.”130 
Citizens, on this view, have “a moral, not a legal, duty—the duty of civility—
to . . . explain to one another . . . how the . . . policies they advocate and vote 
for can be supported” within the “overlapping consensus” comprising values 
common to all (reasonable) comprehensive views and distinctive of none of 
them.131 
The norm of public reason is said to implement liberalism in two ways. 
First, it disciplines those who prevail in political process. Because they are con-
strained to offer a conforming rationale that they honestly believe, the norm of 
public reason puts a check on their impulse to impose a partisan view of the 
good on others.132 Second, public reason protects the autonomy of those who 
are prevailed upon. By assuring that all laws are attended by public justifica-
tions that come within the overlapping consensus, public reason enables even 
those who disagree with such laws to assent to them without feeling that doing 
so forces them to renounce the values central to their identities.133 
Norms designed to conform advocacy to the dictates of “public reason” 
pervade our legal and political practices. Stephen Holmes describes them as 
democratic “gag rules,” which treat appeals to contentious theories of the good 
as out of order, thereby enabling “citizens who differ greatly in outlook on life 
[to] work together to solve common problems.”134 In the legal arena, they in-
clude devices like formalism and minimalism, which enable judges to defend 
outcomes and elaborate the law without resort to more contentious moral 
 
129. See id. at 8-12.  
130. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 175.  
131. Id. at 217-18.  
132. See id. at 217-19.  
133. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 41 (1996).  
134. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 234.  
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claims.135 
In politics, they feature the prominence of broadly utilitarian or consequen-
tialist modes of justification. “Optimal deterrence,” “cost-benefit analysis,” 
“contingent valuation,” and like techniques and devices direct the attention of 
policy advocates to societal welfare economically defined, a good firmly within 
the overlapping consensus of reasonable views. Just as important, by providing 
apparently “objective procedures and criteria” for policymaking—ones “decid-
edly divorced from statements about morality”136—consequentialist modes of 
justification offer an alternative to contentious expressive rationales for contro-
versial policy positions in areas from crime control to environmental regula-
tion.137 
Despite its prominence, public reason has failed as a discourse strategy. 
The problem isn’t that a small but conspicuous constituency in our political life 
has stubbornly refused to purge their rhetoric of divisive cultural appeals. It’s 
that even the agreement of the vast majority of moderate citizens to do exactly 
that has not dispelled pervasive illiberal status competition in our society. Be-
cause our beliefs about which policies promote welfare-enhancing conse-
quences are decisively shaped by our cultural values, a political discourse fo-
cused on secular justifications continues to supply fertile ground for conflict 
over whose worldview the law will affirm. 
Indeed, far from muting this distinctively cognitive form of illiberalism, the 
norm of public reason has amplified its divisive effects. Proponents of public 
reason imagine that the exercise of formulating a secular justification for our 
policy preferences will inhibit us, when we are in a position to exercise political 
power, from indulging the temptation to impose our cultural values on others. 
But as the theory of cultural cognition teaches us, we can’t help but draw on 
our cultural values to evaluate the impact policies will have on the attainment 
of society’s secular ends. By telling those in power that they are in fact satisfy-
ing the duty of impartiality when they sincerely articulate a secular justification 
for the laws they enact, public reason can’t make those persons genuinely im-
partial. It can only make them less aware of the influence that our cultural com-
mitments exert on their policy preferences—a form of self-misunderstanding to 
which persons in general are already vulnerable.138 
At the same time that public reason lulls winners in the political process 
 
135. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 133; David A. Strauss, Legal Argument and 
the Overlapping Consensus 20-21 (July 12, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
136. Martin Rein & Christopher Winship, The Dangers of “Strong” Causal Reasoning 
in Social Policy, SOCIETY, July-Aug. 1999, at 38, 39. 
137. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
413 (1999); Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 1107-08; Note, The CITES Fort Lauderdale 
Criteria: The Uses and Limits of Science in International Conservation Decisionmaking, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1769 (2001). 
138. See Robinson et al., supra note 59. 
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into unselfconscious cultural partisanship, it only accentuates the experience of 
domination for the losers. People are not blind to the influence of cultural 
commitments on the beliefs of those who disagree with them about contentious 
policy issues; on the contrary, they readily perceive this relationship, and for 
that reason to attribute to their adversaries either bad faith or subconscious ra-
tionalization.139 By constraining those in power to justify their policies in secu-
lar terms, then, public reason doesn’t spare dissenters the perception that they 
are being forced to abide by laws that reflect antipathy toward their ways of 
life. It only enrages them by forcing them to endure the smug insistence of their 
adversaries that such policies reflect a neutral and objective commitment to the 
good of all citizens. It is exactly this dynamic that makes policy issues as di-
verse as global warming, gun control, and the minimum wage, such potent 
fonts of cultural recrimination. 
B. For Expressive Overdetermination 
If eschewing appeals to sectarian visions of the good provokes cognitive il-
liberalism, does it follow that an idiom that multiplies such appeals will help to 
contain it? Logically no, but psychologically perhaps. I want to defend a new 
discourse norm, expressive overdetermination, that seeks to contain cognitive 
illiberalism not by stripping it of partisan social meanings but by infusing it 
with so many that every cultural group can find affirmation of its worldviews 
within it. 
Writing with others, I’ve defended expressive overdetermination previ-
ously on instrumental grounds as a device for counteracting the deleterious ef-
fects of cultural cognition on risk regulation and other forms of policymak-
ing.140 Now I intend to offer a broader normative defense of it as a style of 
discourse that fits our aspirations to realize liberal goals in our political life. 
1. What expressive overdetermination is 
Expressive overdetermination would oblige political actors—legislators as 
well as ordinary citizens—to integrate appeals to cultural values into their justi-
fications for law in two distinct ways. First, the imperative of expressive candor 
would oblige such actors to acknowledge, and not conceal, how they under-
stand a law or policy proposal to express meanings distinctive of their own 
worldviews. They would of course be free to advance instrumental justifica-
tions for law, too; what they couldn’t do was insist that the promotion of secu-
lar aims—such as avoidance of harm or the production of societal wealth—
motivates their advocacy independently of any understanding of how a law or 
policy coheres with their visions of an ideal society. 
 
139. See id. 
140. See Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 1096-1100. 
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Second, the imperative of cooperative overdetermination would oblige po-
litical actors to help create conditions under which all citizens can conform to 
the imperative of expressive candor. They would be bound to support efforts to 
craft features of such laws, or alternative ways of framing them, that permit 
persons who hold cultural outlooks opposed to their own to defend the law as 
expressing meanings distinctive of their worldviews as well. And by the same 
token, they would be strictly forbidden to engage in forms of advocacy calcu-
lated to render laws and policies univocal in their meanings. 
The norm of expressive overdetermination effectively stands public reason 
on its head. Under public reason, political actors discharge the duty of civility 
by appealing to the “overlapping consensus” of justifications common to all 
comprehensive views. Under expressive overdetermination, in contrast, they 
discharge that duty by self-consciously constructing a discourse of overlapping 
dissensus comprising a plurality of justifications distinctive of the plural and 
opposing worldviews held by society’s members. 
Mary Ann Glendon’s well-known account of France’s national abortion 
law is an example of expressive overdetermination in action.141 That law made 
abortion legal not “on demand,” but “for a reason.” A woman seeking to termi-
nate her pregnancy was obliged to certify that doing so was necessitated by a 
condition of “emergency” sufficient to justify overriding the fetus’s “right to 
life.” This provision affirmed the worldview of religious traditionalists, who 
had opposed abortion on demand as expressively denigrating the sanctity of 
life. At the same time, the law made the individual woman’s certification of 
“emergency” dispositive; it provided for no legal review of the basis or ade-
quacy of it. As a result, abortion-rights advocates were able to see the law as 
affirming the autonomy of individual women. Precisely because it bore a plu-
rality of meanings—admittedly themselves not fully consistent—the law, ac-
cording to Glendon, relieved both sides of the anxiety that the state was taking 
sides on in a cultural dispute. 
There are many other examples of laws forging pluralistic accommodation 
through expressive overdetermination. American social welfare laws, according 
to Steven Teles, generated a sustained period of political consensus because 
they simultaneously expressed to egalitarians a societal commitment to correct-
ing misdistribution of wealth and to hierarchs a commitment to combating eco-
nomic pressures that threatened to wreck traditional families by forcing women 
into the labor market.142 Tradable emissions laws generated political consensus 
in the early 1990s because they simultaneously affirmed egalitarians’ commit-
ment to environmental protection and individualists’ commitment to markets as 
a means of attaining societal ends.143 The Native American Grave Protection 
 
141. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).  
142. See STEVEN M. TELES, WHOSE WELFARE? AFDC AND ELITE POLITICS (1996).  
143. See Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 1096-97. Individualists also show more 
willingness to accept factual information about the risks of global warming when they are 
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and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) simultaneously affirmed traditional religious 
and sovereignty values, on the one hand, and humanist and enlightenment val-
ues, on the other, by giving Native Americans property rights in tribal artifacts 
while authorizing museums to hold such remains in a form of trusteeship.144 
The enactment of these laws followed a common pattern. In all cases, “cul-
tural vouchers”—individuals bearing authority and credibility within their cul-
tural groups—negotiated the content of the law and then defended it to their in-
dividual constituencies on grounds that expressed their own groups’ 
worldviews.145 Ordinary citizens thereafter embraced the meaning congenial to 
their cultural orientation without either objecting to or interfering with the ef-
forts of citizens of opposing persuasions to embrace the meaning congenial to 
theirs. At all stages, then, participants in these deliberations complied with the 
imperatives of expressive candor and cooperative overdetermination. 
Illiberal status conflict predictably ensues from the breach of such duties. 
Pluralistic accommodation never gets a foothold when political actors fail to be 
expressively candid. To proclaim that one’s position on an issue like gun con-
trol or global warming rests on a culturally impartial view of the facts impugns 
the intelligence and character of those who hold competing positions and thus 
invariably triggers animosity. 
Breaches of cooperative overdetermination, in turn, cause expressive ac-
commodation to unravel. Teles, for example, argues that the consensus over so-
cial welfare in the United States broke down because egalitarian elites insisted 
that welfare policies bear a univocal, egalitarian meaning: by identifying wel-
fare as an instrument for liberating single mothers from dependence on male 
wage earners, these groups made it impossible for hierarchs to support welfare 
as affirming the legitimacy of the traditional family.146 The expressive overde-
termination of “restorative justice”—a scheme in which community groups 
designate reparative public services as a sanction for serious but nonviolent 
crime—is being similarly threatened by a demand for expressive univocality. 
Certain egalitarian and individualist theorists, who support restorative justice as 
more compatible with dignity and individual accountability than imprisonment, 
 
told that nuclear power, a value-affirming policy for them, rather than anti-pollution 
measures, a value-threatening one, is an effective way to combat these risks. See Kahan et 
al., supra note 35, at 4-6. 
144. See Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of 
Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 
EMORY L.J. 569, 588-95 (2006). 
145. See id. at 586-88; see also supra note 35 (describing experiment in which 
“cultural vouchers” were used to minimize cultural conflict over risks of HPV vaccine). 
Appropriately credentialed vouchers are critical, since an advocate who is strongly aligned 
with one cultural perspective is unlikely to enjoy the credibility necessary to convince 
persons of another to see the law as embodying their values. See generally BRYAN GARSTEN, 
SAVING PERSUASION: A DEFENSE OF RHETORIC AND JUDGMENT (2006) (describing suspicion 
toward manipulative advocacy). 
146. See TELES, supra note 142.  
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nevertheless want to purge this form of punishment of the stigmatizing ele-
ments that make it an acceptable alternative to jail for hierarchists and commu-
nitarians.147 
The norm of expressive overdetermination envisions deliberations taking 
place neither in the public square nor in acoustically separated chambers148 but 
rather in a building with thin walls. Accepting that individuals are bound to be 
culturally partial in their reasoning, expressive overdetermination doesn’t imag-
ine a common idiom—instrumental, expressive, or otherwise—that would en-
able citizens to deliberate and persuade one another across cultural boundaries. 
On the contrary, its strategy for dissipating conflict attempts to exploit the rela-
tive insularity of political discourse by infusing law with multiple, culture-
specific meanings. At the same time, nothing in expressive overdetermination 
assumes that cultural groups deliberate outside the earshot of one another. Ac-
cordingly, it obliges citizens to avoid the types of advocacy—akin to behaving 
raucously in a room that abuts one’s neighbor’s bedroom—that foreclose or 
impede the efforts of other groups to form understandings of law affirming to 
them. 
2. How expressive overdetermination works 
I’ve suggested that expressive overdetermination has at least in some in-
stances quieted the illiberal status conflict that is distinctive of cognitive illiber-
alism. But what exactly accounts for its power to do that, and why should we 
believe that such a strategy can realistically be generalized? I’ll supply three 
interrelated answers: one relating to the psychological mechanism behind ex-
pressive overdetermination, another to the preferences of ordinary citizens for 
expressive affirmation of their worldviews in law, and a third to the incentives 
of politicians and opinionmakers to engage in pluralistic discourse. 
The psychological mechanism that accounts for the power of expressive 
overdetermination to quiet illiberal status competition is identity affirmation. 
Cultural cognition posits that individuals process information in a manner that 
protects their group-based identity.149 When they perceive that adoption of a 
policy will impugn the status of their group, they resist information about the 
utility of that policy as a form of psychological self-defense. It follows that one 
way to make individuals more receptive to such policies is to ease any sense of 
identity threat that they might experience. Social psychologist Geoffrey Cohen, 
 
147. See Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and 
Reforming Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143 (2006); Dan M. Kahan, 
What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2090-94 (2006). 
148. Cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation 
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
149. See generally Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of Heuristic 
and Systematic Processing Under Defense Motivation, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 84 (1997). 
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for example, has shown that supplying individuals with information that boosts 
their esteem—for example, a high score on an exam, or having a desirable per-
sonal trait—makes them more willing to assume a position at odds with that 
held by members of their group.150 Expressively overdetermined policies work 
because they have a similar effect: by infusing a law with meanings that affirm 
a person’s worldview, they diminish the status anxiety that might otherwise 
have caused that person to resist its adoption.151 
This explanation for how expressive overdetermination works makes an 
important but defensible assumption about individuals’ preference for expres-
sive affirmation in law: that most persons are expressive moderates. They react 
defiantly when they perceive that adoption of a law would denigrate their cul-
tural worldview. But so long as they can see evidence that the law in fact af-
firms their outlooks, they do not demand that the law be framed in a way that 
denies persons of an opposing cultural persuasion the opportunity to experience 
the same sense of affirmation. This account is supported by the finding of po-
litical scientists that most voters care more about practical issues than moral, 
symbolic ones.152 It is vindicated, too, by the various examples—such as the 
abortion compromise in France, NAGPRA, and the historical consensus behind 
welfare policies in the United States—of expressive overdetermination ena-
bling persons of diverse cultural orientations to converge on mutually accept-
able policies that promoted their common welfare.153 If it’s true that most per-
sons’ preferences for cultural affirmation are largely defensive in nature, then 
expressive politics need not be a zero-sum game. At least in an environment in 
 
150. See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield 
to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151 (2000); Geoffrey L. Cohen, David K. Sherman, Michelle McGoey, 
Lillian Hsu, Anthony Bastardi & Lee Ross, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation 
Reduces Ideological Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/cohen_self_ 
affirmation_draft.pdf. See generally David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accepting 
Threatening Information: Self-Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases, 11 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 119 (2002). 
151. See Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 1097. 
152. See generally FIORINA ET AL., supra note 45. Even in the national election of 
2004, in which many in the media credited President Bush’s re-election to his exploitation of 
gay marriage and other symbolic issues, see, e.g., Adam Nagourney, ‘Moral Values’ Carried 
Bush, Rove Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at A20, “moral values” took a back seat to 
more practical concerns. According to a Pew Research Center poll of 2004 voters, 57% of 
voters identified either “Iraq” (22%), “Economy/Jobs” (21%), or “Terrorism” (14%) as the 
most important issue when those choices were offered as alternatives to “moral values” 
(27%). See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, MORAL VALUES: HOW 
IMPORTANT? VOTERS LIKED CAMPAIGN 2004, BUT TOO MUCH ‘MUD-SLINGING,’ available at 
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=233. Symbolic issues helped Bush 
win not because of their role in cognitively orienting voters concerned with practical issues, 
but because they motivated voters bent on expressive domination. See Kahan & Braman, 
supra note 27, at 162; Gastil et al., supra note 46. 
153. See Braman & Kahan, supra note 144, at 597. 
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which expressive zealots—those who would defy the duty of cooperative over-
determination—are held in check, it is possible to fashion laws with meanings 
that are satisfactory simultaneously to hierarchs and egalitarians, individualists 
and communitarians. 
But is it realistic to imagine that the expressive zealots can be held in 
check? The answer requires investigating the political economy of pluralistic 
discourse. 
Cultural accommodation in law is in fact supported by a small, well-
organized, intensely interested, and highly influential constituency: mainstream 
politicians. Obviously, some politicians thrive by occupying an extremist niche. 
But for the vast majority of democratically accountable officials, a highly po-
larized environment is hazardous. On highly charged issues that lack a middle 
ground, any move a politician makes subjects her to a high a risk of electoral 
retaliation. Elected officials who want to maximize their professional life-
spans, then, prefer forms of discourse that minimize the likelihood that they 
will strongly displease anyone. Indeed, it is precisely this instinct that motivates 
politicians to latch onto consequentialist modes of analysis, which at least ap-
pear to elide more contentious issues of value, when discussing culturally 
charged issues.154 
The problem is that purging their talk of values on such issues doesn’t cre-
ate a discourse environment in which politicians can easily avoid giving of-
fense. Again, because citizens’ factual beliefs as well as their values reflect 
their cultural identities, just cloaking one’s advocacy in empirical arguments 
does nothing to blunt the impression that one is a cultural partisan. What’s 
more, in the resulting climate of recrimination and distrust, many otherwise 
moderate citizens will feel constrained to support openly partisan politicians. 
Expressive zealots will readily fill the vacuum in culturally meaningful dis-
course associated with general conformity to the muted idiom of public reason, 
thus putting all the more pressure on mainstream politicians to cast their lot in 
with one side or the other in the culture wars. 
The norm of expressive overdetermination provides mainstream politicians 
with a much more promising strategy for securing their interest in avoiding cul-
tural polarization. By transforming expressive politics into a positive-sum 
game, cooperative overdetermination dispels the hazards that attend cultural 
polarization. Moreover, when they engage in expressive candor, moderate poli-
ticians can marginalize expressive zealots, who are deprived of both their mo-
nopoly on culturally meaningful rhetoric and the support they garner when citi-
zens are buffeted with empirical claims that are themselves culturally partisan 
in their derivation and status threatening in their effect. 
Expressive overdetermination can also help to dispel the condition of self-
reinforcing distrust associated with public reason. Because the duty of expres-
sive candor obliges political actors to acknowledge that their policy positions 
 
154. See Kahan, supra note 76, at 474-76, 479-80. 
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are motivated by our cultural values, it avoids provoking the resentment of 
those who hold differing beliefs, and who can see (often more clearly than 
those making such arguments) that those who disclaim reliance on their values 
are not being forthright. At the same time, because cooperative overdetermina-
tion obliges political actors to support the formulation of policies that citizens 
of opposing cultural outlooks can also candidly affirm as expressing their fun-
damental values, it furnishes a much more believable sign of policy advocates’ 
intentions not to impose a moral orthodoxy in law. 
The successful communication of this intention is the behavioral lynchpin 
of pluralistic discourse, in legislative chambers and in society at large. Cultural 
pluralism is a public good: a cultural group benefits from the willingness of op-
posing groups to refrain from attempting to impose an orthodoxy, whether that 
group contributes to a political culture of tolerance or not.155 Because opposing 
groups lack the means to coerce each other to contribute, they can be expected 
to settle into an equilibrium of mutual respect only if the example of each one’s 
voluntary willingness to refrain from trying to monopolize the expressive 
power of the law triggers a reciprocal motivation in the members of the oth-
ers.156 The norm of expressive overdetermination has the potential to generate 
this self-reinforcing condition because it continually evidences the disposition 
of all to share the affirming power of the law. The norm of public reason does 
not, because it systematically blinds political winners to their own partisanship 
and predictably triggers resentment in losers for exactly that reason. 
3. Why expressive overdetermination is morally desirable 
A central concern of liberalism is to reconcile law with the respect indi-
viduals are due as beings capable of autonomously forming and pursuing their 
own visions of the good life.157 The state disrespects individual autonomy, ac-
cording to liberal theory, when it predicates the law on a moral or cultural or-
thodoxy, because in that situation it grounds individuals’ legal obligations in a 
conception of the good that they did not choose for themselves.158 Public rea-
son is advanced as a strategy for implementing this goal of neutrality. Individu-
als will experience the law as compatible with their autonomy, advocates of 
public reason argue, only when political actors refrain from invoking particular 
conceptions of the good and instead justify their policy preferences on secular 
 
155. See id. at 488-89. 
156. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, 
and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 73-80 (2003) (summarizing empirical research on 
reciprocity and cooperative solution to collective action problems). 
157. For a classic statement, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785).   
158. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60, 63-64 
(Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).  
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grounds that appeal to all.159 
It should be clear that my objection to public reason is over means and not 
ends.160 Public reason is psychologically naïve. Because of the cultural cogni-
tion of harm, individuals perceive the law as denigrating their visions of the 
good not merely when political actors justify it on culturally partisan grounds 
but also when they justify it on the basis of perceptions of harm distinctive of 
their worldviews. The question, then, is how persons dedicated to making law 
compatible with liberal ideals, including respect for autonomy, would choose to 
speak to each other instead knowing this feature of their own psychology. 
Those persons, I’m arguing, would choose to adopt the norm of expressive 
overdetermination. 
They would opt for expressive overdetermination, first, because of its 
power to promote their common welfare. Reasonable persons of all cultural 
persuasions would desire that they be able to converge, notwithstanding their 
cultural differences, on the best empirical knowledge available on how to use 
law to promote their safety, health, and economic well-being. Expressive over-
determination creates the conditions in which this is most likely to occur. 
Knowledge always travels along cultural pathways. But once persons of diverse 
cultural persuasions are relieved of the apprehension that any particular resolu-
tion of a policy dispute will denigrate their worldviews, there is no systemic 
reason for the pathways distinctive of one cultural group to diverge from those 
of any other. In particular, if none of them have any reason to reject empirically 
sound information, individuals of diverse cultural orientations are much more 
likely to converge on factual beliefs supportive of policies that do in fact pro-
mote their collective well-being. Indeed, in most of the examples of expressive 
overdetermination I discussed—including the French abortion law, tradable 
emissions, and NAGPRA—this was in fact the outcome.161 
Second, individuals who appreciate the constraints of cultural cognition 
would opt for a norm of expressive overdetermination in order to contain illib-
eral status competition. They’d recognize that expressive overdetermination 
can’t “debias” them, at least not in the sense of liberating them (if it would in-
deed be liberating) from their cultural identities as they make sense of the 
world. But by reducing the sheer number of policy disputes that they perceive 
 
159. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 216-18.  
160. It should also be clear that the dispute is not over the content of particular 
policies. I have elsewhere argued that a policy discourse informed by expressive 
overdetermination is more likely to move culturally diverse citizens to converge on policies 
that effectively advance their common welfare. See Kahan et al., supra note 6, at 1096-100. 
But even if one assumed that a political community whose discourse was guided by 
expressive overdetermination ended up with exactly the same policies as one whose 
discourse was shaped by public reason and like norms, citizens of the former community 
would be more likely to experience the law as respectful of their identities than would 
citizens of the latter.  
161. See Braman & Kahan, supra note 144, at 594-95, 598; Kahan et al., supra note 6, 
at 1097-98. 
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as fitting only one group’s view of how the world works, this style of discourse 
would reduce the frequency with which they find themselves impelled into 
status-protective cultural conflict. 
And finally, psychologically realistic persons committed to liberal values 
would opt for the norm of expressive overdetermination in order to minimize 
the risk that any of them would experience persistent alienation. Expressive 
overdetermination, I’ve argued, can reduce the incidence of culturally grounded 
disagreement over policy, but it certainly won’t eliminate it. In the give and 
take of democratic politics, there will inevitably be winners and losers—on 
crime control, on environmental protection, on economic policies, and all other 
modes of instrumental regulation. But as liberal theorists correctly recognize, 
the meaning of losing, and its significance for our experience of autonomy, are 
profoundly affected by how we talk to each other in our deliberations. A cli-
mate in which we are always honest (to ourselves as much as to others) about 
the connection between what we believe and who we are, and in which we 
make it constantly evident to one another that we are committed to enabling 
those with values different from our own to find affirmation of their identities 
in law, will make our apologies for sometimes failing to succeed credible to 
those who on whom we ultimately must impose our will.162 
CONCLUSION 
The nature of political conflict in our society is deeply paradoxical. Despite 
our unprecedented knowledge of the workings of the natural and social world, 
we remain bitterly divided over the dangers we face and the efficacy of policies 
for abating them. The basis of our disagreement, moreover, is not differences in 
our material interests (that would make perfect sense) but divergences in our 
cultural worldviews. By virtue of the moderating effects of liberal market insti-
tutions, we no longer organize ourselves into sectarian factions for the purpose 
of imposing our opposing visions of the good on one another. Yet when we de-
liberate over how to secure our collective secular ends, we end up split along 
 
162. Also taking issue with public reason, Jeremy Waldron argues that legislation 
arising from deliberation in which citizens openly appeal to, rather than conceal, their values 
can generate legal obligation consistent with individual dignity because of the neutrality 
associated with majority rule. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999). I 
agree with Waldron but believe that he is insufficiently attentive to the psychological 
preconditions necessary for citizens to identify with law under these circumstances. 
Obviously, discourse—value-laden or not—that reflects denigration of the political losers’ 
worldviews makes it impossible for those persons to reconcile their cultural and civic 
identities. Even in political defeat, such a reconciliation is possible, however, if the losers 
understand the winners to have been genuinely committed to making it possible for the 
losers to find affirmation of their values even in legislation they object to. A norm of 
expressive overdetermination makes the “dignity of legislation” psychologically realistic. I 
owe thanks to Heather Gerkin for helping me to see the relationship between my position 
and Waldron’s in this respect. 
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exactly those lines. 
The explanation, I’ve argued, is the phenomenon of cultural cognition. In-
dividual access to collective knowledge depends just as much today as it ever 
did on cultural cues. As a result, even as we become increasingly committed to 
confining law to attainment of goods accessible to persons of morally diverse 
persuasions, we remain prone to cultural polarization over the means of doing 
so. Indeed, the prospect of agreement on the consequences of law has dimin-
ished, not grown, with advancement in collective knowledge, precisely because 
we enjoy an unprecedented degree of cultural pluralism and hence an unprece-
dented number of competing cultural certifiers of truth. 
If there’s a way to mitigate this condition of cognitive illiberalism, it is by 
reforming our political discourse. Liberal discourse norms enjoin us to suppress 
reference to partisan visions of the good when we engage in political advocacy. 
But this injunction does little to mitigate illiberal forms of status competition: 
because what we believe reflects who we are (culturally speaking), citizens 
readily perceive even value-denuded instrumental justifications for law as par-
tisan affirmations of certain worldviews over others. 
Rather than implausibly deny our cultural partiality, we should embrace it. 
The norm of expressive overdetermination would oblige political actors not just 
to seek affirmation of their worldviews in law, but to cooperate in forming 
policies that allow persons of opposing worldviews to do so at the same time. 
Under these circumstances, citizens of diverse cultural orientations are more 
likely to agree on the facts—and to get them right—because expressive overde-
termination erases the status threats that make individuals resist accurate infor-
mation. But even more importantly, participation in the framing of policies that 
bear diverse meanings can be expected to excite self-reinforcing, reciprocal 
motivations that make a culture of political pluralism sustainable. 
Ought, it is said, implies can. Contrary to the central injunction of liberal-
ism, we cannot, as a cognitive matter, justify laws on grounds that are genu-
inely free of our attachments to competing understandings of the good life. But 
through a more sophisticated understanding of social psychology, it remains 
possible to construct a form of political discourse that conveys genuine respect 
for our cultural diversity. 
